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Abstract—Remotely generated data by Intent of Things
(IoT) has recently had a lot of attention for their huge
benefits such as efficient monitoring and risk reduction. The
transmitted streams usually consist of periodical streams (e.g.
activities) and highly private information (e.g. IDs). Despite
the obvious benefits, the concerns are the secrecy and the
originality of the transferred data. Surprisingly, although
these concerns have been well studied for static data, they have
received only limited attention for streaming data. Therefore,
this paper introduces a new steganographic mechanism that
provides (1) robust privacy protection of secret information
by concealing them arbitrarily in the transported readings
employing a random key, and (2) permanent proof of orig-
inality for the normal streams. This model surpasses our
previous works by employing the Discrete Cosine Transform
to expand the hiding capacity and reduce complexity. The
resultant distortion has been accurately measured at all stages
- the original, the stego, and the recovered forms - using a
well-known measurement matrix called Percentage Residual
Difference (PRD). After thorough experiments on three types
of streams (i.e. chemical, environmental and smart homes),
it has been proven that the original streams have not been
affected (< 1 %). Also, the mathematical analysis shows
that the model has much lighter (i.e. linear) computational
complexity O(n) compared to existing work.
Index Terms—Steganography, Discrete Cosine, Privacy
Preservation, Authenticity, IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
Lately, enormous interest has been expressed in gathering
data remotely to effectively monitor various activities such
as climate change, border invasion, battlefield scenarios,
nuclear facilities or traffic screening [1], [2]. The streams
are collected wirelessly using small sensors called Internet
of Things (IoT) and forwarded to their final destination
(e.g. operation centers). The continuous streams usually
contain two types of data: (1) normal samples (e.g. activity
data) and (2) extremely secret information (e.g. nuclear
facility or border screen geometric location, facility IDs
and small pictures of the locations coupled with date and
time). Despite the apparent advantages of these activities,
they create various concerns for the privacy of the secret
information and the authenticity of the ordinary readings
(See Fig. 1). Surprisingly, while these concerns have been
well studied for static data [3], [4], [5], they have received
limited attention for streaming data [6].
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The reasons for this are (1) the generators of these
streams (i.e. remote IoT) pose unique challenges (e.g.
their presence in an uncontrollable environment, resource
constraints such as memory and power, and topological
constraints where the data should go through multiple
public hops to the final destination) which prevent a direct
transplant of existing privacy protection and authenticity
techniques [7]; (2) the massive size of these streams force
the operation centers to do offshore operations (e.g. using
cloud servers).
To overcome the identified privacy and authenticity con-
cerns, simple encryption-based techniques using symmet-
ric and asymmetric keys and digital signature have been
proposed [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. However, their
main limitation is that machine learning techniques and
mathematical operations cannot be applied directly to the
encrypted form (i.e. cipher-text) which leads to revealing
the keys to the intermediate hops and cloud providers to
efficiently work on the data (i.e. the confidentially issue).
Continous collected readings to be transmitted.
   Normal Readings 
e.g.  Smart home
Issue1! How can normal 
readings be robustly 
authenticated?
Operation Centres
Issue3! How can machine learning  be applied 
without  disclosing the sensitive information?
 Sensitive information 
        e.g. IDs
Public 
hops
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 be  strongly protected?
Cloud-Based Servers
Fig. 1. Notable issues arise when periodically collected readings by
remote IoT should be directly sent to cloud-based servers for analysis.
The confidentiality issue has been overcome by applying
a different type of cryptography called homomorphism [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18]. The merit of homomorphic cryptog-
raphy is that it allows certain mathematical operations to
be applied to the cipher-text without exposing the keys.
However, homomorphic encryption techniques still cannot
work with many non-linear functions. They are also still
very complex and not practical [19].
Further, the widely used approaches with static data to
maintain a reasonable level of privacy, which are based
on random perturbation [20], [21] and K-anonymity [22],
[23], [24] cannot solve both identified issues together: i.e.
2the privacy of the secret information and the authenticity
of the ordinary readings. In fact, their concerns are slightly
different where the random perturbation is efficient in a
scenario of a central data collector gathers and mines data
from multiple providers, whereas K- anonymity is mainly
used to obfuscate published data [7].
Therefore, researchers are obliged to look for new solu-
tions to do the following tasks. (1) Provide solid privacy
protection for the remotely collected secret data (e.g. geo-
metric location, location picture, IDs and time). (2) Provide
permanent evidence of authenticity for the non-sensitive
collected readings. (3) Allow machine learning techniques
and mathematical operations to be easily applied without
exposing the secret information.
Another candidate technique to protect private informa-
tion and seal transported data is steganography where a
secret message is concealed within a larger transferred
content (e.g. image or signal) in such a way that only
the intended recipient can recover it [25]. However, simple
steganography alone has two limitations. (i) It cannot ensure
controlled access to the secret information because the
hiding is performed in fixed positions (i.e. confidentiality
issue). (ii) It cannot conceal large amounts of secret infor-
mation (i.e. capacity issue). Although steganography has
been widely studied and used in the multimedia domain
[26], we demonstrated how it can be utilized to protect
the privacy and authenticity in the context of streaming
data [27], [28], [29]. However, due to the employed signal
processing types (e.g. Walsh-Hadamard and wavelet), (1)
the size of hidden information was very limited and (2)
computational complexity was very high (e.g. O(n2)) ren-
dering them unsuitable in a limited resource environment.
A. Contribution
• We introduce a novel steganographic based privacy
protection model surpasses existing models in terms
of the appropriate balance between the volume of
embedded secret data (i.e. up to 10 bits per coeffi-
cients), which was about 5-6 bits in our previous works
[28], [29], and the resultant distortion (i.e. < 1%).
This is due to the efficient utilization of DCT signal
processing. This has been examined in details and
showed in Section V.
• We improve the mathematical computational com-
plexity where we achieved a linear steganographic
algorithm O(n) by employing a simple 1D DCT
technique while improving the hiding security into
two dimensional space. This has been mathematically
investigated and presented in Section 5.
In the proposed model, the end-point IoT private in-
formation is randomly concealed inside the periodically
collected normal streams and only authorized parties can
recover this private data. This is achieved as follows. DCT
is applied to the ordinary stream. The resultant coefficients
are then reshaped to 2D M × N matrix employing an
integrated random key (at the remote IoT side). Then,
the key is applied to (1) only obfuscate the secret data
(e.g. IDs, geometric location and location picture coupled
with date and time) using a fast symmetric encryption, and
(2) create an arbitrary sequence of coefficients which will
be followed to conceal the private information. After the
hiding process, an inverse DCT is employed to recompose
the normal stream (i.e. stego readings) and transport them.
Hence, only the parties who have the key (e.g. operation
centers) can recover and decrypt the private data. The other
benefit is that, the stego form of IoT stream can be utilized
without removing the secret bits. Therefore, our algorithm
will allow machine learning techniques and mathematical
operations to be easily applied on stego streams without
exposing the secret information.
II. RELATED WORK
Today, any proposed solution to the remotely collected
IoT streams should carefully contemplate two main char-
acteristics: security (i.e. solid end-to-end protection of the
transmitted secret information and the authenticity of the
transported streams) and efficiency (i.e. allowing mathemat-
ical operations to be directly applied without confidential
information disclosure). However, these features are poorly
balanced in most current solutions. Table I recaps most of
the relevant work and classifies them into five categories
based on the applied mechanisms: using simple, homomor-
phic cryptography, random perturbation and K-anonymity.
III. METHODOLOGY
A balanced level between the two main concerns (i.e.
security and efficiency) has been carefully considered in
the introduced steganographic algorithm as follows: (1) it
is highly improbable for unauthorized parties to discover
the concealed data without a relevant key, and (2) there is
little distortion on the transmitted streams, so they can be
directly used without removing the hidden private data.
The operations at the deployed IoT can be classified into
three stages.
A. The Discrete Cosine Transform
DCT is a widely-known transformation technique that
can convert a stream into a set of frequency components
called coefficients [31], [32]. This is important as it allows
the resultant values to be categorized into an aware energy
distribution where most of the important values can approx-
imate the signal. The significant feature of this mechanism
is that the actual signal can nearly be recomposed from
only a few coefficients.
For a visual demonstration, Fig 2 illustrates the impact
of using DCT on a remotely collected stream. (a) The plot
for >512 weather samples. (b) The resultant values after
performing DCT, which obviously shows the distribution
of the signal major energy (i.e. from 0 to <30), but
others have lower importance. We accordingly wiped all
coefficients between 30 and 512 to proof their impact on the
recomposed stream. (c) The plot displays the recomposed
original weather stream from only <30 coefficients. This
obviously demonstrates the capacity and the flexibility that
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RELATED MODELS SUMMARY.
Protection mechanism Characteristics Notes
Simple Cryptography [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. • Apply symmetric/asymmetric encryption at the remote side.
• All data should be decrypted to perform mathematical opera-
tions.
• All data have to be decrypted before usage.
• Weak Confidentiality.
• Low Efficiency.
• Keys’ management trouble.
Homomorphic Cryptogra-
phy [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18].
• Apply homomorphic crypto at the remote side.
• The obfuscated form of data can be utilized.
• All data have to be decrypted before usage.
• Strong Confidentiality.
• Not working with non-linear func-
tions.
• Not applicable in real applications.
• Low Efficiency.
Random Perturbation
[20], [21]. • Distribute noise along with the principal components.
• Intermediate hops and Clouds can Not work accurately on the
streams.
• Legitimate recipient should take out the noise to fully under-
stand.
• Not optimal with numeric and non-
stationary streams [6].
• No Confidentiality.
• Weak Authenticity.
• Medium Efficiency.
K- Anonymity [22], [24].
• Obfuscate the remote sender within a larger group.
• Intermediate hops and clouds can not work accurately on the
readings.
• Focus on publishing an obfuscated-approximate data’s version
for public usage.
• Has subtle privacy issues [30].
• Weak Confidentiality.
• Weak Authenticity.
• Low Efficiency.
Steganography [27], [28],
[29]. • Embed secret information inside IoT streams.
• Intermediate hops and clouds can work accurately on the stego
readings.
• Using frequency domain for hiding.
• Low hiding capacity.
• Non-linear computational complexity.
can be obtained from the less important coefficients. This
influenced us to exploit DCT to conceal more private data
related to remotely-distributed IoT without augmentation in
the transmitted stream.
There are several variations of DCT, but the most com-
monly used follows Ahmed et. al. [33]. It operates on a
real sequence xn of length N which results in an equal
size sequence yk in a form of Ck coefficients (See Eq 1).
y(k) = w(k)
N∑
n=1
x(n)cos
(
Π(2n− 1)(k − 1)
2N
)
, (1)
where k = 1, ..., N and,
w(k) =
{
1√
N
if k = 1,
2√
N
if 2 ≤ k ≤ N.
(2)
DCT is selected for two main purposes. (1) Erasing or
manipulating much of the resultant DCT coefficients will
not impact the accuracy of the recomposed signal. (2) All
resultant DCT’s coefficients are real numbers which allows
us to directly manipulate and reconstruct, maintaining a
minimum distortion, whereas the resultant values from
other signal processing mechanisms (e.g. Fast Fourier and
Chirp Z) contain an imaginary part that hardens the embed-
ding process and maximizes the distortion. (3) Unlike other
transformation techniques (Walsh-Hadamard and Wavelet),
DCT is very flexible where it can be applied to any stream
length.
Consequently, in this model, DCT is performed on var-
ious real-time IoT streams remotely collected from three
different datasets - explained in Section V - which contains
various readings such as chemical substances (e.g. ethanol),
environment (e.g. temperature) and smart home activities
(e.g. power consumption). The output is then reorganized
to a 2D matrix. The most significant values will not be
altered due to their significant representation to the original
readings. In contrary, certain bits will be manipulated in
the rest of DCT coefficients. However, to ensure the lowest
noise to the original streams, many experiments have been
done to choose a suitable steganography level (i.e. number
of hidden bits in each coefficient) as presented in Fig 3.
The experiments prove that, up to ≤ 10 (ten) bits can
be arbitrarily concealed in the less significant coefficients
without noticeable distortion effect.
B. Hiding
The private data will be concealed inside the resultant
coefficients, after performing DCT to the collected streams.
However, to ensure resilient security and to prohibit in-
truders from recovering this information, a security key is
produced for every distributed IoT node and will be known
only to the end receiver of the data. This key is used to
enforce the following security layers.
1) Confidential Information Encryption: The key is used
to obfuscate the private information (e.g. IDs) before the
hiding process using symmetric cryptography (e.g. AES),
which is secure and suitable for IoT’s abilities (See Fig 4).
This is shown in Eq 3.
C˜ ⇐ E(K,C) (3)
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Fig. 2. IoT readings: (a) Direct plot, (b) After applying DCT and (c) recomposed form after zeros more than 95 % of DCT coefficients.
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Fig. 3. Resultant distortion after concealing different number (i.e. 1 to 10) of bits in each DCT coefficient.
where E is an AES algorithm, K is the key, C is the
original private data and C˜ is the encrypted form.
3
Sensitive Sensor information
Location ID: X123456
Geomtric Location: X/Y/Z
Signature
Convert 
into bits
100100010100111...
Encrypt
1010100110110001...
000100100010110...
Secret  bits
=
Start Time: 12:00:00 pm 
Remote Location
.........
Date: 20/09/2014
Security KEY
(e.g. XYLm!ci...)
End Time: 20:00:00 pm 
Location photo Logo
a
Fig. 4. An example of how the private information is obfuscated before
hiding.
2) Coefficients Scrambling: The key is employed to
scatter and reorganize the resultant DCT coefficients from
a vector to 2D M ×N matrix (See Fig 5).
Resultant DCT Coefficients
High Sequence
 Coefficients
Low Sequence
 Coefficients
Split Low sequence coefficients
and Reshape to 2D MXN Matrix 
1
Rescale the numbers to int
and convert into bits
2
M x NPortion of the coefficients matrix  
b
Fig. 5. Block diagram presents how the DCT coefficients are split,
rescaled and converted into bits.
53) Random Hiding Order: The key is employed to create
a random sequence of coefficients in a form of 2D matrix
that will be used to conceal the private information. This
is shown in Eq 4.
N˜ × M˜ ⇐ fx(K) (4)
where N˜ × M˜ is the created 2D sequence of coefficients
and fx is the generation function.
For better understanding, Fig 6 shows a demonstration
of using the key to produce an arbitrary hiding sequence.
Step 1: the key is transformed into ASCII i.e., Default
ASCII and an initial order is distributed i.e., Position Order.
Step 2: the ASCII is then ordered in ascending manner
i.e., Ascending Order. simultaneously, shuffle the Default
Position to keep track of the original ASCII locations.
Then, another sequence is assigned i.e., Ascending
Position. Step 3: return the ASCII to its initial format
by using the Default Position. A new unique sequence is
ontained i.e., Descending Position M˜ . The reason of the 3
steps is to prevent two identical sequences from various
keys. Step 4: by reversing the order, almost identical steps
i.e., 1-3 are reiterated to generate N˜ . Finally, M˜ and N˜ are
combined to compose the 2D matrix sequence. However,
the key is much longer (e.g. ≥ 128) in the proposed model.
  6   8  1  5  2  9  4  10  7  3
Key Symbols :  X  c    !    W   2    m    R    z      a   Q
Defult ASCII: 88  99  33  87  50  109  82  122  97  81  
Position Order :  1   2   3    4    5     6    7    8     9   10
Ascending Order : 33  50  81  82   87   88   97   99  109 122
Defult Postion : 3    5   10   7    4     1     9    2     6    8
Ascending Position : 1    2    3    4    5     6     7     8   9    10
 Defult Position:  1   2     3     4     5     6     7    8    9  10
Descending Position :  6   8     1     5     2     9     4   10   7   3
1
2
3 Defult ASCII: 88  99   33   87   50   109  82 122 97 81  
Portion of the 2D order 
Repeat steps 1,2 and 3
 in descending order
5
4
8 4 1 7  2  9 6 10 3 5 
Build 2D random Order 
M
N
M NX
Columns
Rows
Fig. 6. Demonstration of a 2D concealing matrix order M˜ × N˜ that is
created from the key.
These three steps will guarantee that only an authorized
receiver who has the security key can recover and decrypt
the private information properly.
The detailed process of hiding is shown in Fig 4, 5,
6 and summarized in Fig 7. After applying DCT to the
ordinary stream, the output is scattered and recomposed to
M×N 2D matrix. Then, the key is employed to obfuscate
the private information. After that, the key is harnessed to
create the random 2D sequence. The private bits will be
then concealed corresponding to this order. The summary
of all steps in this process is shown in section III-C.
C. Hiding Steps Summary
1) The private information is classified and obfuscated
(i.e. using the key) ⇒ secret bits.
000100100 0101100011...
M NX c
a
000100100
0101100011
b
M NXPortion of the 2D order 
Portion of the 2D Coefficients M x N
Hide in Coefficient (6,8). 
Then, (6,4) and so on
Hide encrypted bits in the 2D MXN coefficients matrix 
following the 2D random order
(Fig. 5)
(Fig. 6)
(Fig. 7)
Fig. 7. Block diagram summarizes the hiding process and use the
information explained in Figures 4, 5 and 6.
2) Hiding order is created (i.e. using the key) ⇒ 2D
M˜ × N˜ .
3) DCT is applied on normal streams.
4) Least important coefficients are selected. Based on
our observations from all experiments on three differ-
ent datasets, the important coefficients were ≤ 20%
because of the nature of the data in this context.
5) Rescale these coefficients ⇒ integer why?
To make sure the selected coefficients are ready for
steganography, they should be in an integer format
and to avoid the issue of differentiating between
negative and positive, all numbers should be positive.
This may be done by adding a threshold ϕ and
multiplied by ϑ to maintain all their details (i.e. four
decimal positions).
6) DCT coefficients are scattered ⇒ 2D M ×N .
7) The hiding process is started.
8) After finishing, the resultant coefficients recomposed
then rescaled by dividing all stego coefficients by ϑ
and subtracting the threshold ϕ.
9) Re-combine coefficients and apply invrse DCT.
D. Inverse Discrete Cosine Re-Transform
The output of the embedding stage is named stego coef-
ficients. The stego coefficients at this point is re-scattered
to a vector, and the Inverse DCT applied to re-transform
the collected streams to the initial time domain. The output
of this process is Stego stream (i.e. comprises concealed
private data) which is almost similar to the original stream.
The advantage of that is - as will be shown in Section V
- the stego streams can be immediately utilized. However,
only the key holder parties can recover the hidden data and
validate them. The DCT inverse can be formulated as in
Eq 5.
6x(n) =
N∑
n=1
w(k)y(k)cos
(
Π(2n− 1)(k − 1)
2N
)
(5)
where k = 1, ..., N and,
w(k) =
{
1√
N
if k = 1,
2√
N
if 2 ≤ k ≤ N.
(6)
E. Private Information Recovery
To accurately extract and decrypt the private hidden bits,
the security key has to be obtained. The process is nearly
similar to the concealing steps, but the bits will be recovered
rather than embedded. Fig. 8 demonstrates the recapped
steps. First, DCT is applied to stego stream. The key is
then employed to reorganize the DCT coefficients into a 2D
form and create the selected coefficients’ sequence. Next,
the secret bits’ recovery is started, corresponding to the
produced order. Finally, the key will be used to decrypt the
secret bits and verify the resultant information.
Apply 
DCT
Stego 
readings
Split and
reshape
   DCT
coefficients
Key
Generate 
order in 2D
Retrieve
Secret Bits2D
coefficients
Coefficients
Order
Shift the KEY
    1 position
Decrypt
secret bitsSecret
bits
Confidential
information
Fig. 8. The main steps to extract the sensitive information.
IV. EVALUATION
This section concentrates on the proposed model assess-
ment from various angles such as the key robustness, hidden
data security, the supreme size of private information that
can be concealed and the distortion measurements.
A. Key Robustness
Both transmitted streams and the private key is required
to be revealed in advance to recover the concealed secrets
by legitimate parties. On the other hand, an anonymous
intruder has to be aware of the existence of hidden message
in addition to performing a brute force attack to break the
model, which makes it extremely difficult.
However, the security key plays an important role in our
model due to its usage to ensure various security layers
(See Figs. 4, 5 and 6): (1) obfuscate the private information
(2) reorganize DCT values into 2D M × N matrix, and
(3) create a random coefficients’ sequence as 2D M˜ × N˜
matrix to conceal the bits. Therefore, the secrecy of this key
is extremely important. The two involved parties should
maintain this key very carefully. (a) At the first party
(i.e. remote IoT), the key has to be integrated, and (b)
the second party (e.g. operation centers) has to protect
this key and employ it to recover and check the validity
of the hidden private information whenever is required.
Accordingly, Only stego streams are visible to other parties.
The key strength of our model can be quantified as
the entropy bits’ number H (See Eq. 7) where 2H is the
supreme possibilities that would need to be examined by
anomalous intruders during a brute-force attack.
H = log2N
L (7)
Where L is the total symbols length and N is symbols’
probabilities. Table II presents a demonstration of different
key lengths, key symbols sets and the total number of their
possibilities.
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT USED KEYS STRENGTH
Key length Symbol Set Possibilities
64 US-ASCII 7.2e+134
128 US-ASCII 5.2e+269
256 US-ASCII ∞
64 UTF-8 1.3e+154
128 UTF-8 ∞
256 UTF-8 ∞
64 UTF-16 ∞
128 UTF-16 ∞
256 UTF-16 ∞
B. Unauthorized Retrieval
To protect the private embedded bits from brute-force
recovery, the reorganized 2DM×N coefficients after DCT
transformation of the collected streams have to be higher
than arbitrary size (e.g. > Key volume) (See Eq 8).
Tp =
r∑
i=t
R!×
c∑
j=t
C!×NL (8)
Where Tp is the combinations entropy, C and R are
the reorganized 2D coefficients and t is an offset which
highlights the lowest entropy of each row selection. r refers
to the highest entropy of the rows in R×C matrix, and
identically c refers to the maximum number of columns in
that matrix.
For instance, assume collected streams of size 512 points,
and reorganized to 2D coefficients of 32×16 after perform-
ing DCT. The chosen offset is 16 × 8, the key charter set
is UTF-8 and its volume is 128 (See Eq 9).
Tp =
32∑
i=1
32!×
32∑
j=16
32!× 256128 ⇒ Tp =∞ (9)
Consequently, this confirms that recovering and decrypt-
ing the intended private data properly in a reasonable time
is highly improbable.
C. Hidden Data Size
The maximum amount of hidden data in X-stream
mainly depends on two values: (1) the stream’s size X
(e.g. temperature) and (2) the hidden bits per coefficient.
7However, if we use the streams directly even by hiding
1 bit per reading, the distortion will be high. One of the
possible solutions is using signal processing to transform
the readings from their time domain to frequency domain.
Based on that, another dimension becomes very important
to the hiding capacity which is the coefficients’ selection
process. Therefore, this feature has been exploited in our
model to exclude few important coefficients and hide more
data in others to maximize the capacity with maintaining
low distortion. In the proposed algorithm, the maximum
number of bits that can be hidden in X transmitted stream
with maintaining the lowest distortion impact is shown in
Eq 10.
b =
n∑
i=1
((R× C)− h)×B (10)
Where b is the highest entropy of hidden bits, n is the
total streams samples, R and C are the rows and columns
of the reorganized 2D coefficients after applying DCT
transformation to the original values, h is the number of
high sequence coefficients and B is the concealed bits in
each coefficient.
For instance, suppose that DCT transformation is exer-
cised to ordinary stream, and the size of the reorganized 2D
matrix is 16× 512 (i.e. R and C). Also, suppose the high
sequence coefficients is ≤50 (i.e. the value of h) and about
9 bits (i.e. value of B) are concealed in each coefficient.
Consequently, nearly 9159 bytes (9 KB) of private data can
be concealed within these coefficients.
D. Stego Efficiency
To precisely evaluate our model’s impact on the collected
streams, the margin between the ordinary and stego streams
(i.e. resultant distortion) has been thoroughly monitored
using percent of Percentage Residual difference (PRD). The
PRD is a widely-used measurement that is known for its
precision of detecting any recomposition error between the
ordinary and the recomposed streams as defined in Eq. 11
[34].
PRD =
√√√√∑Nn=1(x(n) − x˜(n))2∑N
n=1(x
2(n))
× 100 (11)
where x(n) and x˜(n) are the ordinary and the recomposed
streams, and N is the stream’s size.
The PRD measurement is also employed to accurately
calculate the resultant distortion caused by the recovery pro-
cess (i.e. between the ordinary and the extracted streams).
All results are highlighted in Section V.
E. IoT Resource Constraints
Because of the IoT device limitations, the worst com-
putational complexity (e.g. exponential) has been avoided
during the developing of the algorithm’s functionalities.
Therefore, the worst-case complexity has been examined in
two ways. (1) As shown in Table III, big O notations have
been used. The majority of the functions are designed as
linear tasks. It should be noted that Scattering and Sequence
generation has been improved from quadratic to linear due
to the utilization of radix sorting. From that, our algorithm
is fully compatible with the new wireless network standards
called IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee [35]. IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee
standards are already running algorithms with the computa-
tional complexity of logarithmic O(n log n) and quadratic
O(n2) [36], [37]. (2) All streams in the repositories have
been used and the execution time proved to be very low -
< 0.025 seconds - as presented in Fig 9.
The main tasks of the concealing model (See Table III)
that has to be executed by the remote IoTs are DCT and its
inverse, random sequence formulation, private information
scattering and embedding. Firstly, let’s suppose f(n) is
O(g(n)) if f develops at farthest as g. Consequently, f(n)
= O(g(n)) only if there occurs c, n0 ǫ R
+ such that for all
n ≥ n0, f(n) ≤ c.g(n). From that, for each 1D vector of
a stream of length n (i.e. 500 to 2048 in our experiments),
the extreme complexity will be as follows. (i) O(n) for
the time and space needed for DCT and its inverse [31].
(ii) O(nk) for creating random sequences using a constant
key size k ǫ Z after its enhancement to the linear problem.
The space needed is the summation of n and k. (iii)
The extreme required complexity for scattering the private
information of length m where at the lowest < n/2 is
O(m). (iv) O(nb) for concealing b ǫ Z (i.e. 1 to 10) bits
in each coefficient of maximum length n, but the needed
space is the accumulation of both n and m.
It is obvious from the table that there is stability in the
complexity in all three cases. This is due to the careful
usage of the DCT in its simplistic form (i.e. 1D) and
improving it by linear mathematical operations to achieve
the required level of protection.
TABLE III
ALGORITHM FUNCTIONALITIES COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Complexity Time Space
Best Average Worst Worst
DCT/Inverse O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n)
Random Order O(nk) O(nk) O(nk) O(n+ k)
Scramble Sensitive O(m) O(m) O(m) O(m)
Embedding O(nb) O(nb) O(nb) O(n+m)
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Datasets
To test the effectiveness of our model with different types
of non-stationary streams data, three datasets have been
examined. (1) Chemical dataset gathered and distributed by
the University of California, Irvine Research Group [38]. It
contains extensive periodical readings over three years for
six different volatile organic compounds: ethanol, ethylene,
ammonia, acetaldehyde, acetone and toluene. (2) Environ-
ment dataset collected and published by Intel Berkeley
Research Lab [39]. It offers detailed continues readings (i.e.
every 31 seconds) over three months for four environmental
characteristics: humidity, temperature, voltage and light. (3)
Smart Homes dataset collected and published as a part
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Fig. 9. The required time and space needed by our algorithm to accomplish both hiding and retrieval process (a) 6 types of readings from the chemical
dataset (b) 4 types of readings from the environmental dataset and (c) 7 examples of readings from the smart homes dataset.
of ”Project Smart*” by Laboratory for Advanced System
Software [40], [41]. It contains comprehensive periodical
readings over three months (every minute) for different
homes. The types of streams are power consumption, heat-
index, inside/outside weather, inside/outside moisture and
wind-cold. It also offers the utility consumption (electric-
ity) from nearly 400 anonymous houses every minute for
(24× 30× 3) hours.
B. Experiments
In this paper, all the above types of streams were used
to thoroughly prove the feasibility of implementing the
proposed algorithm on various collected streams. For all,
experiments were done to conceal and recover the private
data based on our algorithm steps presented in Sections
III-B and III-E. The secret bits was a set of values that
have to be private such as location ID, geometric location,
location picture, date and time which all transformed into
bits to be concealed inside the transmitted streams.
Our tests can be distributed into the following. (1)
Hiding, which is done by remote IoT sensors to hide the
remote locations’ private data in their collected streams
as presented in Section III-B. (2) Private information re-
covery that is at the receiver’s end as described in III-E.
Consequently, if the transmitted stego streams that contain
the hidden private bits are sniffed or brutally altered by
unauthorized parties, (1) it will not disclose any private
information and (2) it can be easily examined and verified.
To obtain neutral and unbiased results, detailed experi-
ments were performed with ranges of key sizes in addition
to various collected streams having lengths (e.g. 512-
to-4096). To highlight the extreme distortion impact, all
detailed low sequence DCT values (i.e. around 95% of the
total coefficients) have been employed. For brevity, only
a few examples of our results are presented, (1) Fig. 10
shows an instance using the chemical dataset of a plot of
6 ordinary streams used to conceal private data, the stego
and the extracted forms. (2) Fig. 11 shows an example using
environment dataset of another plot of 4 ordinary streams,
and the stego form before and after the extraction process.
(3) Fig. 12 presents another example using smart homes
dataset of a plot of 7 ordinary streams in addition to their
stego and extracted forms. (4) Tables IV, V and VI show
the PRD measurements from all aforementioned datasets’
streams between the actual and stego forms in addition to
actual and the recovered forms.
C. Discussion
Despite the various sample lengths of the streams and
various values’ ranges, all PRDs are < 1%. This proves
that the influence will only be to the less significant decimal
digits (i.e. third or fourth) that typically are ignored. This
guarantees that our technique will have stable and little
distortion impact on the actually transmitted streams. On
the contrary, it offers a promising solution with a paradigm
shift for protecting the privacy of the transmitted private
information as well as the originality of the periodically col-
lected streams. The merits of this solution are as previously
stated. (1) There are robust end-to-end privacy protection
and authenticity where the hidden secured information can
only be recovered and verified by legitimate recipients (e.g.
operation centers), whereas others can only see the stego
form which is almost similar to the original streams. (2)
There is no increase in the actually transmitted streams.
(3) There is no change to the original stream’s form which
helps the legitimate receivers to directly exploit operational
administration such as cloud providers’ services without
disclosing private information. In other words, all mathe-
matical operations can be directly applied to the transmitted
stego form of streams even at intermediate hopes and cloud
while maintaining the privacy and authenticity.
D. Comparison with Existing Models
The comparison focuses on two folds. Firstly, the superi-
ority of this model over our previous steganographic-based
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Fig. 10. 6 examples of chemical IoT streams: (a) Direct plot for original form (b) Stego form that contains the hidden private information (i.e. IDs)
and (c) Recovered form (i.e. after removing the sensitive information).
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Fig. 11. 4 examples of environment IoT streams: (a) Direct plot for original form (b) Stego form that contains the hidden private information and
(c) Extracted form (i.e. after removing the private information).
techniques in the context of IoT streams [27], [28], [29]
which has been summarized in Table VII. Secondly, there
are recent works proposed by Vongurai and Phimoltares
[42], Biswas et. al. [43], and Bhaskar et. al. [44] that
have similar signal processing (i.e. DCT) with a different
context (i.e. multimedia domain). Therefore, our work is
compared with these three recent techniques where (1)
in [42], the authors used DCT decomposition to conceal
a secret message inside transmitted JPEG image; (2) the
authors in [43] utilized DCT to hide a secret data inside
a colored image using a predefined password; (3) the
authors in [44] applied DCT to hide a secret content inside
transmitted MPEG-4 videos.
The proposed technique has the following improvements.
1) After experimenting with the same number of the
transmitted collected streams, it is clear from Fig. 14
that the capacity of the hidden secret information is
much higher in our algorithm than in models [42],
[43], [44] where up to 10 bits can be concealed
in each DCT value because of exploiting the least
significant DCT coefficients, whereas just 1 to 2 bits
can be concealed in their algorithms.
2) From Fig. 13, it should be noticed that our algorithm
has less resultant distortion than other algorithms
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Fig. 12. 7 examples of smart homes IoT streams: (a) Direct plot for original form (b) stego form that contains the hidden private information (i.e.
geometric location) and (c) Extracted form (i.e. after removing the private information).
TABLE IV
PRD RESULTS FOR CHEMICAL DATA SET READINGS
Batch 9 Batch 10
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
1 0.1989 0.2437 0.1887 0.2284
2 0.3068 0.3611 0.6665 0.7834
3 0.0520 0.0638 0.3157 0.4126
4 0.0399 0.0477 0.2304 0.2858
5 0.0305 0.0377 0.1206 0.1498
6 0.6483 0.6485 0.4974 0.5928
7 0.0432 0.0531 0.1839 0.2159
8 0.0937 0.1157 0.1042 0.1266
9 0.3214 0.3979 0.6452 0.8083
10 0.1954 0.2220 0.2375 0.2842
11 0.1887 0.2284 0.2376 0.2789
12 0.5818 0.6941 0.9745 0.2284
13 0.3643 0.4494 0.3766 0.4524
14 0.4365 0.5152 0.4162 0.4973
15 0.3679 0.4631 0.6326 0.7817
16 0.1453 0.1797 0.1804 0.2268
because it has been designed specifically to be aware
of the sensitivity of the important features of the
numeric data, whereas other algorithms designed to
wider content (e.g. images and videos).
3) Most significantly, our model is strongly secure com-
pared to the models in [42], [43], [44] due to their
static and immediate secret bits distribution in the
absence of a strong key or using just a simple
password, but in our model various security layers are
implemented which are scattering the resultant DCT
values, obfuscating the private bits and producing a
random sequence derived from the key to dynami-
cally distribute the bits among arbitrary coefficients.
TABLE V
PRD RESULTS FOR INTEL DATA SET READINGS
Temperature Humidity
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
1 0.0708 0.1033 0.3492 0.3514
2 0.0723 0.1030 0.0538 0.0674
3 0.0711 0.0878 0.0514 0.0650
4 0.0707 0.0906 0.0734 0.0889
5 0.0779 0.1081 0.2528 0.2255
6 0.0787 0.1086 0.0549 0.0662
7 0.0700 0.0964 0.1544 0.1572
8 0.0686 0.0963 0.0573 0.0654
Light Voltage
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
9 0.0220 0.0253 0.0360 0.0611
10 0.0606 0.0750 0.6936 0.4837
11 0.0331 0.0376 0.7041 0.4613
12 0.4276 0.4276 0.7264 0.4886
13 0.0138 0.0170 0.8326 0.9902
14 0.0521 0.0645 0.7328 0.5115
15 0.0511 0.0631 0.7130 0.4661
16 0.0182 0.0218 0.7053 0.4382
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, a new secure steganographic technique has
been introduced to protect privately transmitted information
with streams by distributing them randomly employing a
secret key. This will provide (1) robust end-to-end pri-
vacy protection for sensitive information, and (2) strong
proof of originality for the normal streams. To ensure
the highest hiding capacity, DCT is applied to compose
the readings into a group of coefficients. To guarantee
minimum distortion, only the least significant values are
used. To strengthen the security, a key is used to (1)
only obfuscate the private information, (2) reorganize the
coefficients into a 2DM×N , and (3) create a random order
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Fig. 13. Resultant distortion after applying our algorithm and the algorithms in [42], [43], [44] on the same amount of numerical data. (a) PRDs
between the original and stego form, (b) PRDs between the original and the extracted form.
TABLE VI
PRD RESULTS FOR SMART PROJECT DATA SET READINGS
Power Heat-Index
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
1 0.1019 0.1019 0.0346 0.0411
2 0.0076 0.0091 0.0334 0.0409
3 0.0077 0.0094 0.0337 0.0399
4 0.0132 0.0155 0.0311 0.0391
5 0.0131 0.0158 0.9506 0.9509
6 0.7173 0.7173 0.0321 0.0388
7 0.1148 0.1148 0.0337 0.0416
8 0.0901 0.0901 0.0324 0.0377
Wind-Cold In-Weather
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
9 0.0343 0.0412 0.0292 0.0362
10 0.0346 0.0389 0.0293 0.0374
11 0.0335 0.0408 0.0296 0.0369
12 0.0322 0.0376 0.0286 0.0361
13 0.0314 0.0376 0.0294 0.0364
14 0.0310 0.0398 0.0292 0.0349
15 0.0341 0.0411 0.0301 0.0368
16 0.0309 0.0369 0.0297 0.0362
In-Moisture Out-Moisture
Segment
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Recovered
17 0.0506 0.0609 0.0298 0.0356
18 0.0507 0.0626 0.0306 0.0357
19 0.0479 0.0600 0.0303 0.0362
20 0.0524 0.0615 0.0317 0.0407
21 0.0510 0.0596 0.0296 0.0364
22 0.0459 0.0577 0.0304 0.0366
23 0.0507 0.0592 0.0268 0.0320
24 0.0434 0.0534 0.0267 0.0336
in the form of 2D M˜ × N˜ used in the hiding process. The
resultant distortion has been carefully measured in all stages
- the original, the stego, and the extracted forms - using
a well-known measurement called PRD. After thorough
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF IOT STREAMS STEGO-BASED SOLUTIONS AND OUR
APPROACH
Feature [28] [29] Our approach
Signal processing Walsh-Hadamard Wavelet DCT
Complexity O(n log n) O(n)2 O(n)
Hiding per/coefficient 5 6 10
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Fig. 14. Comparison for the maximum amount of secret data that can
be hidden between our algorithm and the algorithms in [42], [43], [44].
experimentation on three different types of streams (i.e.
chemical, environment and smart homes) it has been proven
that our model has little impact on the actual readings (<
1%). Also, computational complexity has been proven to
be much lighter O(n) compared to existing work.
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